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Abstract
There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision
of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxa-
tion and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by
adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson
rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demon-
strating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the
new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good
without imposing any separability assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that
distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the
main determinants of optimal provision are completely diﬀerent and the traditional formula
with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case. (JEL: H41, H23, H11)
∗We are grateful to Kenneth Small for discussions leading up to this paper. We also wish to thank Henrik
Jacobsen Kleven for detailed comments on a preliminary draft.
1 Introduction
Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool in everyday government decision making on public
projects. When carried out in practice, the dominating view seems to be that the costs of a
tax-funded project should be adjusted according to the marginal cost of funds (MCF), as a close
reflection of the deadweight loss that will materialize if the project is added to the budget.1
Today, the theoretical foundation for such a practice is less clear.
The simple view described above originates from the pioneering papers by Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). They argued that the famous Samuelson rule
– which equates the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good of all citizens
to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) – relies on an unrealistic first-best setting where
individual lump sum taxes are available. Instead, they base their analyses on distortionary
taxation and arrive at a modified Samuelson rule where the eﬀective cost of public goods is
identified as MCF times MRT. This ‘standard approach’ has been very influential and also
underlies the survey of Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
The standard approach has since been further developed by integrating the government
spending side more thoroughly in the analysis and by allowing for heterogeneity in earnings
abilities across households (Dahlby, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001; Gahvari, 2006; Kleven
and Kreiner, 2006). Two important conclusions emerge from these extensions. First, the eval-
uation of public projects should take account, not only of the distortionary eﬀect of taxation
as reflected by the MCF, but also of government revenue eﬀects stemming from behavioral
responses generated by the expenditure side of the projects. For example, a government in-
vestment in infrastructure or child care may increase working hours, and thereby tax revenue.
Second, distributional concerns become important for the optimal level of public goods. It
matters how benefits and costs are distributed across households.
In contrast, the ‘new approach’ to the optimal provision of public goods argues that dis-
tributional concerns are irrelevant to the evaluation of public projects. This line of research,
initiated by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and further pursued by Christiansen (1981) and
1See, for example, Boardman et al. (2006) p. 104. Evaluation of tax-funded public projects in Denmark
assumes that the cost of financing is 1.2 times the actual expenditures, corresponding to the oﬃcial Danish
marginal cost of funds (the Danish Ministry of Transportation and Energy, 2003).
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Kaplow (1996), holds that unintended distributional eﬀects can be undone by the income tax.
Their analyses rely on the benefit principle, which, building on the flexibility of the non-linear
income tax, argues that each individual should contribute to the financing of a public good
corresponding to her own marginal willingness to pay. Formally, Christiansen (1981), in the
context of the optimal non-linear income tax, and Kaplow (1996), for a general tax function,
have shown that this principle restores the original Samuelson rule when preferences are sep-
arable in leisure and goods (including public goods). This somewhat surprising result arises
because the eﬀects on individual behavior from the benefit side and from the cost side of a
government project cancel each other out, implying that a change in government consumption
has no indirect eﬀects on tax revenue.
The divergent results of the traditional approach and of the new approach have created a
state of confusion as illustrated by the debate in the wake of Kaplow’s (2004) survey (see Goulder
et al., 2005, and the reply by Kaplow). One reason for this confusion may simply be that the
underlying analyses appear to be very diﬀerent. Another likely reason is that the new approach
has been inextricably linked to a restrictive assumption on preferences, although the underlying
benefit principle applies much more generally. The fundamental diﬀerence between the two
approaches lies in the assumption made about the financing of the public good. Unlike the new
approach, the standard approach imposes no restrictions on the way the project is financed.
An argument in favor of this approach is that the income tax is not suﬃciently flexible to
exploit the information about the distribution of the benefits from the public good. However,
the lack of restrictions on the financing scheme has the potential drawback of leading way
to distributional concerns that are unrelated to the public goods problem itself. As a result,
government consumption may become a means to compensate for a lack of appropriate tax
instruments. In contrast, the new approach follows the tradition in analyses of optimal taxation
by assuming away exogenous restrictions on the instruments available to the government, except
the restriction that innate abilities cannot be observed and taxed directly. This eliminates any
distributional concerns due to the specifics of the financing scheme. But, at its current state,
the new approach suﬀers from the strong assumption of separable preferences.
This paper contributes in diﬀerent ways to the literature on optimal provision of public
goods. First, we generalize previous results in both the standard approach and the new approach
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by considering a very general framework that accounts for heterogeneity in both earnings and
preferences and allows for home production through Beckerian type household consumption
technologies.
Second, we use the framework to reconcile the results of the two approaches. The traditional
approach addresses the problem of optimal provision by examining whether a budget-neutral
expansion of government consumption raises social welfare. The new approach, on the other
hand, considers an expansion of government consumption together with an adjustment of the
non-linear income tax that keeps everybody at the same utility level (the benefit principle). The
optimality criterion then becomes whether government revenue increases or not. We demon-
strate, using a simple duality property, that both approaches derive from the same basic formula,
requiring that a public project is completed only when the social marginal benefit of the project
(SMBP) exceeds the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF).
Third, and most importantly, we contribute to the new approach by deriving a fully gen-
eral, intuitive formula for the optimal level of public goods without imposing any separability
assumptions on preferences. The formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to
play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are
very diﬀerent and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very
special case where the willingness to pay for the public good is linear in ability.
Our general formula identifies the partial correlation between ability and the marginal will-
ingness to pay for the public good as the driving force behind any deviations from the Samuelson
rule. That is, public goods provision should only be less (more) than the Samuelson rule predicts
if high ability individuals have a higher (lower) marginal willingness to pay for the public good
– when evaluated at a given earnings level. We may observe that high earning, high ability
individuals have a higher willingness to pay for the public good. However, if this correlation is
driven entirely by the eﬀect of income on the willingness to pay (as is the case with a standard
normal good) the Samuelson rule still applies. Only a partial eﬀect directly from ability to the
willingness to pay leads to a departure from the Samuelson rule since any correlations with
income can be made distributionally neutral through appropriate adjustments of the income
tax.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model with a continuum of agents
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and preference heterogeneity. Section 3 derives a general formula for the optimal level of a
public good when there are no restrictions on the financing scheme as in the standard approach.
Section 4 shows the relationship between the standard approach and the new approach, and
derives a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good when marginal tax
changes are governed by the benefit principle. In Section 5 we provide a special case where
the two approaches lead to identical results, and where the simple, traditional formula with its
emphasis on MCF applies. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers a few concluding remarks.
2 The Framework
This section presents a general framework to analyze the optimal provision of public goods.
The model has a continuum of agents, each characterized by an innate ability n, which is also
our index of identification. The distribution of abilities across the population is given by the
non-degenerate density function f (n). Each agent derives utility from private consumption
c and from public goods g provided by the public sector. Both c and g could be thought of
as either a vector of consumption goods or a single composite good. Gross earnings or, more
generally, taxable income is denoted z, and acquiring income imposes a utility loss on the agent.
The utility of agent n equals
u (c, g, z, n) , (1)
where uc ≡ ∂u/∂c > 0, ug > 0, uz < 0, and u (·) is quasiconcave. This utility specification
embodies preference heterogeneity across individuals of diﬀerent abilities. It also encompasses
the traditional Mirrleesian specification, u (c, g, z/n), as a special case. The term z/n builds on
the notion that more able persons must exert less eﬀort to attain a given income level. If this
logic is extended to other domains of everyday life, as in Becker (1965), it seems natural that
ability also has an impact on the utility of consuming, as long as the skills of home production
are correlated with market productivity. The theory of household production views market
goods as an input in a production process, which, along with individual skills, determines the
output that ultimately enters individual utility. Thus, persons of diﬀerent skills may benefit
diﬀerently from a given input of c or g. For instance, an individual’s ability to cook determines
the utility derived from a basket of groceries. Similarly, the utility derived from public goods
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such as the police or the judicial system depends on both the skill and the need to benefit
from such institutions, which is likely influenced by individual ability. Thus, the formulation
in (1) captures both innate preference diﬀerences between individuals of diﬀerent abilities and
preference diﬀerences due to the technology of home production.
Since the government cannot condition taxes on the unobservable ability, it is forced to
operate a (possibly) non-linear income tax function T (z, θ), where θ is a shift parameter used
to capture the eﬀects of changes to the tax function. Consumption equals c = z−T (z, θ) which,
together with the utility function (1), give
MRScz (z, n) ≡ −
u0z (z − T (z, θ) , g, z, n)
u0c (z − T (z, θ) , g, z, n)
, (2)
MRScg (z, n) ≡ −
u0g (z − T (z, θ) , g, z, n)
u0c (z − T (z, θ) , g, z, n)
, (3)
which measure the marginal rates of substitution between, respectively, c and z and c and g for
a type n individual at the income level z. Notice that an increase in the ability level aﬀects the
MRS’s both directly and indirectly through an impact on the earnings level z. The first-order
conditions for the optimal choices of c and z imply
MRScz [z (n)] = 1−m, (4)
where z (n) denotes the optimal income level and m ≡ ∂T (z (n) , θ) /∂z is the marginal tax rate
at that income level. The indirect utility function is v (n) ≡ u [c (n) , g, z (n) , n] and gives the
utility level of individual n when consumption and labor supply are chosen optimally. We follow
the standard approach in optimal taxation and contract theory and assume (i) that utility is
increasing in ability, ∂u/∂n > 0, and (ii) that the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is
satisfied (e.g., Salanié, 2003):
∂MRScz (z, n) /∂n < 0. (5)
The first assumption along with the Envelope Theorem ensures that the indirect utility is
increasing in ability, dv/dn = ∂u/∂n > 0. The second assumption ensures that the tax system
is implementable, i.e., that higher ability individuals always choose higher equilibrium earnings,
implying that the government can use income as a signal of the underlying ability.
The government cares about redistribution as well as the provision of public goods. The
preferences of the government are captured by a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function of
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the form
Ω =
Z
n
Ψ [v (n)] f (n) dn, (6)
where Ψ (·) is a concave function reflecting the distributional concerns of the policymaker. The
marginal rate of transformation between private goods and public goods (MRTcg) is nomalized
to one, without any loss of generality. The government budget constraint then becomes
R ≡
Z
n
T (z, θ) f (n) dn− g ≥ 0,
where the public goods nature of g is seen from the fact that g enters only once in the government
budget constraint but still appears in everyone’s utility functions.
A reform is characterized by two parameters: the change in the supply of the public good dg
and an associated adjustment of the tax function dθ. Diﬀerentiating (6) and using the first-order
condition (4) yields the eﬀect of a marginal reform, (dg, dθ), on social welfare
dΩ
λ
= −dθ
Z
n
ω (n)
∂T (z, θ)
∂θ
f (n) dn+ dg
Z
n
ω (n)
u0g
u0c
f (n) dn, (7)
where λ ≡
R
nΨ
0 (·)u0c (·) f (n) dn is the average social marginal utility of income in society and
ω (n) ≡ Ψ
0[u(·)]u0c(·)
λ is the social marginal welfare weight of agent n. Similarly, the eﬀect of a
reform on government revenue is given by
dR = dθ
Z
n
∂T (z, θ)
∂θ
f (n) dn− dg +
Z
n
m
µ
∂z
∂θ
dθ +
∂z
∂g
dg
¶
f (n) dn, (8)
where the first two terms are the direct revenue eﬀects while the last term captures the eﬀect
of behavioral responses on government revenue. These behavioral responses are driven both by
changes to the tax schedule and by eﬀects of government consumption on household utility.
3 The Standard Approach
The standard view of optimal public goods supply is due originally to Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974) and has exerted a tremendous influence on the practice
of cost-benefit analysis (e.g., Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). This approach to deriving a formula
for the optimal public goods supply does not impose any restrictions on the financing scheme
other than the requirement that the reform is fully financed, i.e., dR = 0. From eq. (8) this
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yields
dg =
dθ
R
n
h
∂T (z,θ)
∂θ +m
∂z
∂θ
i
f (n) dn
1−
R
nm
∂z
∂gf (n) dn
.
A marginal expansion of g is desirable if it increases social welfare, dΩ ≥ 0. Insert the above
expression in (7) and apply this test to getR
n ω (n)
u0g
u0c
f (n) dn
1−
R
nm
∂z
∂gf (n) dn
≥
R
n ω (n)
∂T
∂θ f (n) dnR
n
£∂T
∂θ +m
∂z
∂θ
¤
f (n) dn
. (9)
The earnings choice of the household, determined by eqs (2) and (4), may be written as a
function zˆ ((1−m) , y, g, n), where (1−m) is the marginal net-of-tax rate and y ≡ mz−T (z, θ)
is virtual income. The uncompensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax
rate may then be defined as ε ≡ 1−mz
∂z˜
∂(1−m) . From the Slutsky-equation, it may be decomposed
into a compensated elasticity and an income eﬀect, that is ε = εc−η where εc is the compensated
elasticity and η ≡ − (1−m) ∂z˜∂y is the income eﬀect.2 Further, let
Φ ≡ ∂m/∂θ
∂a/∂θ
, s (n) ≡ ∂T
∂θ
/
µZ
n
∂T
∂θ
f (n) dn
¶
, (10)
where a is the average tax rate. The parameter Φ captures the progressivity of the implied tax
reform, and s (n) is the share of the direct tax changes that is borne by agent n. Using this we
can rewrite (9) in terms of behavioral elasticities to arrive at Proposition 1.3
Proposition 1 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable iﬀR
n ω (n) ·MRScg (·) f (n) dn
1−
R
nm
∂z
∂gf (n) dn
≥
R
n ω (n) s (n) f (n) dnR
n
³
1− m1−m (Φ · εc − η)
´
s (w) f (n) dn
. (11)
Proof: See Appendix A. ¤
2Previous contributions have defined hours-of-work elasticities. The elasticity of taxable income captures
hours-of-work responses as well as all other behavioral responses that are relevant for total tax payments, and
the empirical evidence indicates that this elasticity may be significantly larger than the hours-of-work elasticity
(e.g. Gruber and Saez, 2002).
3When deriving the behavioral responses to the tax reform, we follow the standard approach and assume that
the tax schedule is piece-wise linear. This ensures that there is no feed-back eﬀect from the change in z to the
marginal tax rate, and thus no additional earnings responses beyond those triggered directly by the tax reform.
Mathematically, we avoid including second derivatives of the tax function (T 00) into the formula. The assumption
of piece-wise linearity implies that there will be bunching at the various kinks in the tax schedule. This does not
constitute a problem for our final results but may imply that taxable income elasticities are zero at a kink point
because marginal changes are not suﬃcient to move the individual away from the kink point.
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Expression (11) generalizes the result of Dahlby (1998), Gahvari (2006), and Kleven and Kreiner
(2006) to a more general setting. Intuitively, a marginal expansion of the public good is desirable
when the social marginal benefit of the project (SMBP, the left-hand side) exceeds the social
marginal cost of public funds (SMCF, the right-hand side). The expression for SMCF is the
continuous-setting equivalent to the social marginal cost of public funds derived in Dahlby
(1998) with elasticities defined on taxable income rather than more narrowly on labor supply.4
Proposition 1 demonstrates the importance of tax distortions and distributional considera-
tions for the optimal level of the public good. Without distributional weights, ω (n) = ω ∀n,
and without initial tax distortions, m = 0 ∀z, the Samuelson rule applies (independently of
how a marginal expansion of the public good is financed). Introducing positive marginal tax
rates implies that the optimal g may be lower or higher than prescribed by the Samuelson rule,
depending on the sizes of the behavioral eﬀects stemming from changes to the tax schedule (the
RHS denominator) and from changes to the public goods supply (the LHS denominator).
Distributional concerns aﬀect the optimal level of public goods, even in the absence of any
tax distortions. Consider, for example, the case where the aggregate willingness to pay for a
public project exceeds the total costs of the project. Such a project should be implemented
according to the original Samuelson rule but not necessarily according to the above modified rule
which depends on the financing scheme. If, for example, high-income people receive most of the
benefits and the public project is financed by a lump sum tax, the project might be discarded
because the distribution of welfare is worsened. However, such a conclusion ignores the flexibility
of the non-linear income tax, and thereby assigns a role to distributional considerations that
are unrelated to the problem of public goods provision (see also Auerbach and Hines, 2002).
This approach may have merit when there are exogenous constraints that limit the adjustment
of the tax schedule as emphasized by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001) and Gahvari (2006). On the
other hand, without any specific justification for constraining the tax function, it is natural to
consider a financing scheme where those who benefit from the public good also pay the extra
taxes, thereby neutralizing any distributional eﬀects. This is the direction taken by the new
approach.
4Kleven and Kreiner (2006) include both intensive and extensive labor supply responses. We have chosen
to follow the tradition in analyses of the optimal provision of public goods and MCF by focusing on intensive
responses alone.
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4 The New Approach
The new approach evaluates the benefits of an expansion of the public good by use of the
benefit principle, introduced by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and applied by Christiansen
(1981) and Kaplow (1996, 2004). According to this principle, a (marginal) expansion of g
should be financed by a benefit-oﬀsetting, or distribution-neutral, change in the tax function.
Since the reform keeps individual utilities unaﬀected the merits of a marginal expansion of g
depend on the implied changes to government revenue, i.e., if dR ≥ 0 the expansion of g should
be implemented. This is incompatible with the method used to derive the optimal level of g in
the standard approach of the previous section. Indeed, condition (9) was derived by considering
whether a budget-neutral reform, dR = 0, raised social welfare, dΩ ≥ 0. Instead, we use an
alternative approach that keeps social welfare unaﬀected and determines the desirability of a
marginal expansion of g by calculating the eﬀect of the reform on government revenue. If the
eﬀect is positive, the reform is socially desirable. We show in Appendix B that the requirements
dΩ = 0 and dR ≥ 0 are equivalent toR
n ω (w)
u0g
u0c
f (n) dn
1−
R
nm
∂z
∂gf (n) dn
≥
R
n ω (w)
∂T
∂θ f (n) dnR
n
£∂T
∂θ +m
∂z
∂θ
¤
f (n) dn
, (12)
which is the same as condition (9). The fact that we arrive at the same formula as in the
standard approach is not surprising since we have merely applied a dual approach to determine
the optimal level of g. Importantly, the equivalence of (9) and (12) provides a link between the
two approaches. Indeed, they both derive from the same basic formula. The diﬀerence lies in
the assumptions made regarding the associated tax reform.
The benefit principle makes the change to the entire tax schedule endogenous, i.e., at every
income level both the direct change to the tax burden and the change in the marginal tax rate
are determined endogenously by the requirement that the utility of all individuals is unchanged,
implying that v (n) and v0 (n) are fixed. Thus, we consider a reform, (dg, dθ), that aﬀects g and
the tax function T (·) such that
dv (n) = u0c (·) dc+ u0g (·) dg + u0z (·) dz = 0 for all n, (13)
dv0 (n) = u00cn (·) dc+ u00gn (·) dg + u00zn (·) dz = 0 for all n, (14)
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where we have used that v0 (n) = u0n (·) because of the Envelope Theorem. The benefit-oﬀsetting
expansion of g adjusts the tax function to capture the benefits of the additional g from each
individual n. Since the tax function depends on income, not ability, the reform may have
distortionary eﬀects on the incentive to work.
Total diﬀerentiation of the relationship c = z−T (z, θ) yields dc = (1−m) dz− (∂T/∂θ) dθ.
We can use this and the first order condition (4) to rewrite (13) as
∂T (z, θ)
∂θ
dθ =
u0g (·)
u0c (·)
· dg =MRScg (z, n) · dg. (15)
This equation shows that the increase in the tax burden of an individual with earnings z
is exactly equal to the extra benefit from the expansion of government consumption. After
substituting for dc in condition (14), we obtain
dz =
u00cn (·) ∂T (·)∂θ dθ − u00gn (·) dg
u00cn (·) (1−m) + u00zn (·)
. (16)
For any given individual n, this relationship displays the eﬀect of the reform on the incentive to
supply earnings. The first term in the numerator captures the eﬀect on the marginal incentive
to supply earnings from the increased tax burden, while the second term captures the eﬀect
from the expansion of g. Any discrepancy between the individual cost and the individual benefit
of the tax-cum-public good reform functions just like a change in the eﬀective marginal tax rate
and thus aﬀects earnings. Only when the two eﬀects on the marginal incentive are exactly
aligned is there no change in individual income. This is entirely consistent with the benefit
principle, which cannot condition reform changes on the unobservable ability.
By diﬀerentiating the definitions in eqs (2) and (3) w.r.t. n and using eqs (4) and (15), we
may write eq. (16) in the following way
dz =
∂MRScg (z, n) /∂n
∂MRScz (z, n) /∂n
· dg, (17)
where the single-crossing condition (5) implies that the denominator is negative. The partial
derivatives in this expression measure the eﬀect of ability on the marginal rates of substitution
between, respectively, c and g in the numerator and c and z in the denominator.
The application of the benefit principle implies that the expansion of g and the accompanying
change in the tax function keeps everyone’s utility, and thus social welfare, unchanged. Now
10
eq. (15) gives
R
n ω (w)
ug
uc dg · f (n) dn =
R
n ω (w)
∂T
∂θ dθ · f (n) dn implying that condition (12) is
equivalent to Z
n
∙
∂T
∂θ
dθ +m
µ
∂z
∂θ
dθ +
∂z
∂g
dg
¶¸
f (n) dn ≥ dg. (18)
From eqs (15), (17), and (18), it is now possible to establish our main result:
Proposition 2 A marginal expansion of a public good is desirable iﬀZ
n
µ
MRScg (z, n) +m · ∂MRScg (z, n) /∂n∂MRScz (z, n) /∂n
¶
f (n) dn ≥MRTcg. (19)
Proof: This follows by inserting eqs (15) and (17) in condition (18). ¤
Proposition 2 shows that the Samuelson rule must be amended by a term that is aﬀected by
the partial correlation, i.e., conditional on income, between ability and the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good. The additional term corrects for the revenue implications of the
behavioral responses to the reform. The optimal level of g is aﬀected by correlations with the
unobservable n because the tax function is constrained to depend on the imperfect signal that
is income. It is important to note that the partial eﬀects on the MRS’s in (19) are evaluated
at a given income level. Thus, variations in MRS due entirely to variations in z do not aﬀect
the optimal public goods supply. The total eﬀect of higher ability on the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good is given by
dMRScg (z, n)
dn
=
∂MRScg (z, n)
∂z
dz
dn
+
∂MRScg (z, n)
∂n
.
This is illustrated on Figure 1, which displays indiﬀerence curves and the marginal rate of
substitution between private consumption and public goods. A low-ability person who has
low earnings/private consumption is at point L, while a high-ability person with high earn-
ings/private consumption is at point H. Assume first that the preferences of both agents are
given by the solid indiﬀerence curves i1 and i2. In this case, the high-income person has a higher
willingness to pay for the public good (MRScg is larger at H than at L), which is only natural
when g is a normal good because both agents receive the same level of public good consumption
g¯. This eﬀect works entirely through earnings, dz/dn, and does not aﬀect the optimal level of
g since both types have the same willingness to pay when located at the same earnings/private
consumption bundle. Rather, the crucial test is whether the slope of the indiﬀerence curves of
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people of diﬀerent ability diﬀer when evaluated at a given income/consumption level. This sit-
uation arises if the preferences of the high ability person are instead represented by the dashed
indiﬀerence curves i01 and i02. In this case, the high-ability person has a higher willingness to
pay at any given point, implying that the public good eﬀectively redistributes based on the
unobservable ability.
Intuitively, when marginal tax rates are positive, the supply of public goods is reduced
relative to the first best if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good increases with
ability. In this case, the benefit principle implies that higher incomes must contribute more to
the financing of the public good. However, part (or all) of the additional benefit enjoyed by
persons with higher incomes stems from their innate ability and is realized independently of the
chosen income level. Thus, the additional taxes implied by the reform reduce the incentive to
work. The size of the additional distortion depends on the responsiveness of earned income as
captured by the denominator of the second term in (19). Also, the stronger is the influence of
ability on the marginal willingness to pay, the more diﬃcult it is for the government to finance g
in a non-distortionary fashion. An alternative way to view this result focuses on how the concern
for redistribution aﬀects the optimal level of g. When persons of higher ability benefit relatively
more from the presence of the public good, the supply of g adversely aﬀects the government’s
scope for redistribution. Indeed, the public good eﬀectively redistributes in favor of the rich.
This point applies the same logic as do Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Blackorby and
Donaldson (1988) in the context of in kind transfers. Also, Kaplow (2008) provides a similar
intuition for the case of public goods but does not arrive at our general formula (19). A reversal
of this argument explains why the public goods supply should be higher than advocated by the
Samuelson rule when there is a negative correlation between ability and the marginal willingness
to pay for the public good. In this case, supplying g provides an additional means to redistribute
in favor of the poor.
Education seems to be an example of a good that is valued higher by the more able, even
conditional on income. Presumably, people of higher innate ability are better equiped to benefit
from educational training. If so, the optimal public financial support for education is less than
the Samuelson rule predicts because such support eﬀectively redistributes income towards the
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more able.5 In contrast, public transportation is likely to benefit persons of lower ability more
for a given income. Eﬃcient public transportation reduces the travel time to and from the
workplace, leaving more time for other activities. A low ability individual must work longer
hours to uphold a given income and therefore, presumably, values her sparetime more. Thus,
subsidies to public transportation eﬀectively redistribute income towards the less able, over and
above what is attainable through the income tax. Importantly, consumption patterns across
incomes do not necessarily reveal the desirability of public transport subsidies. If low income
individuals choose public transport because they cannot aﬀord a car, not because they are of
low skill, the Samuelson rule still applies.
Proposition 2 also clarifies when the original Samuelson rule obtains. The suﬃcient condition
is that there is no partial eﬀect from ability to the willingness to pay for the public good. Thus,
the crucial question for the determination of the optimal g is whether the marginal willingness
to pay is diﬀerent for a person of high ability when she imitates the choices of a lower ability
individual. If this is not the case, implying that people of diﬀerent ability have the same MRScg
for given z, the Samuelson rule applies and distributional considerations should not aﬀect the
level of the public good. This does not rule out that people of diﬀerent ability, as they position
themselves at diﬀerent income levels, have diﬀerent willingness to pay in equilibrium. In this
case, the financing of the public good is not uniform under the benefit principle and, as a result,
marginal tax rates are aﬀected. But these tax variations are not distortionary as the marginal
willingness to pay also varies with income. Diﬀerential financing is only distortionary when
taxpayers can avoid the additional burden without reducing the benefit they enjoy from the
public good. Thus, armed with Proposition 2 we can generalize the result of Kaplow (1996) to
a more general class of utility functions:6
Corollary 1 Assume that individual utility satisfies the separability assumption: u (c, g, z, n) =
u˜
£
w1 (c, g, z) , w2 (z, n)
¤
. Then an expansion of g is socially desirable whenever the Samuelson
5Education is, of course, not a public good but our argument also applies to externalities as discussed in the
conclusion. Note also that redistribution policy may discourage private investments in education. This gives a
second-best argument in favor of subsidizing education (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
6Note that u = u˜ (w (c, g) , l), which is used in Kaplow (1996), is a special case of the utility function in
Corollary 1, where w1 (c, g, z) = w˜1 (c, g) and w2 (z, n) = z/n.
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condition holds, i.e., Z
n
MRScgf (n) dn ≥MRTcg.
Proof: The marginal willingness to pay for g is MRScg =
u01(·)w10g (·)
u01(·)w10c (·) =
w10g (c,g,z)
w10c (c,g,z)
, which is
independent of n. Thus, ∂MRScg/∂n = 0 implying that (19) reduces to the Samuelson rule. ¤
The above utility specification implies that variations in the marginal willingness to pay for the
public good derive from income directly, not the underlying ability (∂MRScg/∂n = 0). If the
marginal willingness to pay increases with income, the benefit principle implies that marginal
tax rates increase as a result of the reform but these changes are not distortionary as the
individual benefit from the public good also increases with income (see Blomquist et al., 2008,
for a similar point).
When utility is given by the standard Mirrleesian specification u (c, g, z/n) the formula for
the optimal g can be written in terms of correlations between the marginal willingness to pay
for g and labor supply, l = z/n. This is because with the standard utility function any positive
correlation with n implies a negative correlation with l.
Corollary 2 With a Mirrleesian individual utility specification u (c, g, z, n) = u˜ (c, g, z/n), an
expansion of g is socially desirable wheneverZ
n
µ
MRScg (z, l) +m · ∂MRScg (z, l) /∂l∂MRScz (z, l) /∂l
¶
f (n) dn ≥MRTcg.
Proof: With the Mirrleesian utility function, we can use the relation z = n · l to express the
change in n as a function of the dependence of MRS on l instead. Indeed,
∂MRS
∂n
=
∂MRS
∂l
∂l
∂n
= −∂MRS
∂l
z
n2
⇒ ∂MRScg (z, n) /∂n
∂MRScz (z, n) /∂n
=
∂MRScg (z, l) /∂l
∂MRScz (z, l) /∂l
Insert this in eq. (19) to arrive at the above result. ¤
When ability is restricted to aﬀect utility only through l, the evaluation of a public project
departs from the Samuelson rule if the marginal willingness to pay for the public good depends
on individual labor supply. Thus, if MRScg displays a negative partial correlation with l, the
optimal level of the public good is less than predicted by the Samuelson rule (notice that the
denominator in the second term under the integral is now positive). In this case, the public good
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is valued relatively more by those who must deliver fewer working hours to attain a given income,
i.e., people of higher ability. Therefore, the public good impacts negatively on the government’s
ability to redistribute income. However, the opposite situation is equally plausible. When
MRScg increases with l the optimal g is higher than the first best level. Finally, note that the
correlation with working hours is only a suﬃcient statistic when the utility function has the
shape considered in Corollary 2. It does not necessarily carry over to the general utility function
(1).
5 Equivalence Between The Two Approaches: A Special Case
Generally, the formula for the optimal g deviates from Proposition 2 when the associated tax
reform is not governed by the benefit principle. Thus, the standard approach generally leads
to diﬀerent results than those obtained in the previous section. However, in one special case
the two approaches are equivalent and the simplest form of the standard formula obtains. The
latter holds that public goods should be expanded ifZ
n
MRScg · f (n) dn ≥MCF ·MRTcg,
where MCF is the marginal cost of raising public funds. This simple representative agent version
of the modified Samuelson rule focuses only on the distortionary eﬀects of raising taxes and
disregards distributional concerns. We now show that there is a special case where this simple
formula obtains using the new approach.
Assume utility is given by
u = c+ n · w (g, z)− n · h (z/n) , (20)
where the functional form of the disutility of labor is taken from Saez (2001) and implies that
n reflects potential earnings. The above specification implies that utility from the public good
is linear in ability. If we depart from this functional form, the simple standard formula does
not obtain.
A marginal expansion of g is desirable iﬀ (see Appendix C)Z
n
MRScg
µ
1− m
1−mε
¶
f (n) dn ≥MRTcg, (21)
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where ε is the (compensated) elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
This formula identifies MCF as a central determinant of the optimal g. If, in addition, the
income tax system is linear initially and the elasticity of taxable income is constant across
individuals, the condition simplifies toZ
n
MRScg · f (n) dn ≥ 1
1− m1−mε
·MRTcg =MCF ·MRTcg,
which is identical to the most simple version of the modified Samuelson rule (Browning, 1987,
Dahlby, 1998, and Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). However, only when utility from the pub-
lic good is linear in ability and the intial tax system is proportional is the traditional MCF
correction valid.
6 Concluding Remarks
The central challenge involved in decisions on the optimal level of a public good is that cor-
relations between the marginal willingness to pay and, respectively, ability and income are
observationally equivalent but have vastly diﬀerent policy implications as first noted by Hyl-
land and Zeckhauser (1979). For instance, are wealthy people overrepresented among opera
audiences because they are wealthy, or because they are of higher ability? For some purposes
casual observation may be suﬃcient to decide on the desirability of a public project. When
more detailed analyses are called for, one is left to search for observable characteristics that
have a known (or estimable) relationship with ability. Indeed, if we have knowledge about the
eﬀect on the willingness to pay for the public good of some observable variable that is correlated
with ability, this relationship should enter the determination of g. The observable characteris-
tic could be education or even height. While there may be both ethical and practical concerns
behind the absence of such variables in the tax function, such concerns have no bearing against
their inclusion in the determination of g since the variables are not used to calculate individual
tax burdens, only to identify the socially optimal g.
While the analysis in this paper has focused on public goods, the results may be directly
applied to the correction of externalities. We may think of g as a global externality and MRScg
as the willingness to pay for a marginal reduction of the externality. The cost of reducing g is
then the costs of, e.g., abatement or alternative production methods. As argued by Kaplow and
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Shavell (2002), the most eﬃcient way to regulate externalities is through a price scheme that
reflects marginal harm. When consumption patterns diﬀer across individuals, the costs and
benefits of such a scheme may be unevenly distributed. However, any distributional eﬀects that
are driven by preference variations due directly to income can be undone through adjustments
of the income tax (see also Kaplow, 2006). Only when the willingness to pay for harm reduction
is correlated with ability should the externality correction depart from first best rules.7
A Proof of Proposition 1
The eﬀect of the tax reform on government revenue is
∂R
∂θ
=
Z
n
∙
∂T
∂θ
+m
µ
∂zˆ
∂y
∂y
∂θ
− ∂zˆ
∂ (1−m)
∂m
∂θ
¶¸
f (n) dn,
which is identical to the denominator on the right-hand side of (9), except that ∂z/∂θ has been
decomposed into an income eﬀect and an eﬀect from the change in the marginal tax rate. The
change in virtual income is
∂y
∂θ
= z
∂m
∂θ
+m
∂z
∂θ
−m∂z
∂θ
− ∂T (z, θ)
∂θ
= z
µ
∂m
∂θ
− ∂a
∂θ
¶
,
where a ≡ T (z, θ) /z is the average tax rate and ∂a/∂θ ≡ ∂T (z,θ)∂θ /z. This implies that
∂z
∂θ
=
∙
∂zˆ
∂y
µ
∂m
∂θ
− ∂a
∂θ
¶
− 1
1−mε
∂m
∂θ
¸
z,
where ε ≡ 1−mz
∂zˆ
∂(1−m) is the uncompensated elasticity of taxable income. We may rewrite this
using the Slutsky equation
∂z
∂θ
=
µ
η
∂a
∂θ
− εc∂m
∂θ
¶
1
1−mz,
which implies
∂R
∂θ
=
Z
n
∙
1 +
m
1−m
µ
η − ∂m/∂θ
∂a/∂θ
εc
¶¸
∂T
∂θ
f (n) dn.
Insert this in the denominator on the right-hand side of (9) and use the definitions (10) in order
to obtain formula (11) in Proposition 1.
7 If the externality is not global but aﬀects only part of the population, it is necessary for the results that the
income tax can follow the same demographic patterns. For instance, pollution in a major city mainly aﬀects its
citizens and compensation schemes must then be designed to aﬀect only the citizens of that same city. This is
possible if regional taxes are in place and can be adjusted freely. However, local tax functions are often subject
to constitutional restrictions. In this case, and when the externality aﬀects subsets of the population that cannot
be explicitly targeted, the benefit principle can no longer be applied and alternative methods must be used.
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B Derivation of Equation (12)
From eq. (7) and the condition dΩ = 0 we get
dg =
R
n ω (n)
∂T
∂θ dθf (n) dnR
n ω (n)
u0g
u0c
f (n) dn
.
We may rewrite eq. (8) as
dR =
Z
n
dθ
∙
∂T
∂θ
+m
∂z
∂θ
¸
f (n) dn− dg
µ
1−
Z
n
m
∂z
∂g
f (n) dn
¶
.
Insert dg from above and apply the criterion dR ≥ 0 to get (12).
C Derivation of Equation (21)
We start by deriving dz from eq. (16). With the utility function (20), we have u00cn = 0,
u00gn = w0g (·), and the first-order condition for the choice of earnings (4) implies
h0 (·) = 1−m =⇒ dz
d (1−m) =
n
h00 (·) ,
which gives the (compensated) elasticity of earned income w.r.t. the take-home rate as
ε ≡ dz/z
d (1−m) / (1−m) =
nh0 (·)
zh00 (·) .
The cross-derivative u00zn then becomes
u00zn = h
00 (·) z
n2
= (1−m) 1
n
1
ε
.
By inserting this relationship and u00cn = 0 into (16), we obtain
dz = −MRScg
1−m εdg,
where we have used MRScg = nw0g (·). By substituting the above expression and eq. (15) into
condition (18), we obtain the inequality (21).
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